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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ICC TO PASS ON MOTOR CARRIER USE OF PIGGYBACKING EXTENT OF "INITIAL MOVEMENT"
AUTHORITY OF AUTOMOBILE
HAULERS By a petition dated June 27, 1960, the National Automobile Trans-

porters Association, a corporation having present membership of fifty-seven common
carriers and six contract carriers by motor vehicle engaged in the transportation
of automobiles and related articles and purporting to speak on behalf of the
automobile hauling industry, sought from the Interstate Commerce Commission
a declaratory order' under the provisions of section 5(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 2 interpreting Administrative Ruling No. 75,' promulgated by the
Commission's Bureau of Motor Carriers. The concern is with the meaning of the
term "initial authority," as that term is used in Ruling No. 75, insofar as it relates
to the extent of the authority granted to those engaging in "initial movement."
More precisely, the petitioner was seeking a ruling as to whether a motor
carrier holding initial authority to transport motor vehicles only from A to D
may transport them to B, a non-service point intermediate to D, there load the
trailer on a rail flat car, for handling in trailer-on-flat-car or "piggyback" service
to C, another non-service point intermediate to D, where it would again take
possession of the shipment and move it by truck to its ultimate destination, D,
without first obtaining specific authority either to serve B or C or to operate
from C to D.4

The matter was referred to an Examiner for hearing and the recommendation
of an appropriate order. Following a hearing, in which the petitioner, NATA,
certain automobile manufacturers, and a number of rail and motor carriers
participated, several of whom intervened in opposition, and after the submission
of briefs, the Hearing Examiner, on July 20, 1961, issued his recommended order
denying the petitioner's requested interpretation.- The matter is currently pending
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, with a decision expected to be
rendered in the latter part of 1961.
This proceeding involves a highly important question relating to the legality
of motor carrier operations in the transportation of motor vehicles. The problem
which confronts the motor carriers, the railroads, and the shippers of motor
vehicles is nation-wide in scope. The proceeding grows out of confusion as to the
rights of motor carriers to utilize trailer-on-flat-car service (TOFC) provided by
railroads. The necessity for the issuance of a declaratory order was felt by the
NATA:
to be demonstrated by reference to the pendency before the Commission
of a number of proceedings, the disposition of which would require such
interpretation and by the fact that in two of such cases two Commission
Examiners faced with practically identical facts, had reached diametrically
opposite conclusions, citing the same
Commission precedent in support of
their diametrically opposed views. 6

In the final analysis, much of the national transportation policy may have to be
scrutinized and perhaps changed.
The Supreme Court, in reviewing an ICC decision, once said: "The national7
transportation policy is the product of a long history of trial and error by Congress."
1
2

3
4

Docket No. MG-C 3024, September 30, 1960.
60 Stat. 240 (1946) 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1958):
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of any
application, petition, or other request of any interested person made in connection with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial or
where a denial is self explanatory, such notice shall be accompanied by a
simple statement of procedural or other grounds.
FED. CARR. REP. 1 25075, at 26151 (July 15, 1938).
Report and Order of the Hearing Examiner, No. MG-C 3024, July 20, 1961.

5

Ibid.

6

Brief of the National Automobile Transporters Association in Docket No. MC-C 3024,

October 24, 1960.

7

MacLean v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 (1944).
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The first step in the formulation of such a national policy was the passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. 8 The purpose of the Act was the regulation of
common carriers doing interstate business, which, for all practical purposes, were
the railroads. The end in view was the control of these industries to bring about
a more effective carrier coverage of the whole nation, while protecting the individual
carriers from one another. The Act, while not perfect in this regard, was on the
right track to a more efficient country-wide transportation system. However, with
the advent of the twentieth century, a new carrier came upon the scene. During
the 1920's, this new form, the motor vehicle, developed rapidly.
Yet, the Interstate Commerce Commission could correctly state in 1928 that
interstate carriage of property by motor carrier was not significant enough to
warrant legislation." But the depression of the 1930's changed this. It is estimated
that thirty-one per cent of the nation's railroads were in receivership during this
period. 10 When the railroads' business fell off, the motor carriers moved into the
field. The situation then existing was best described by a Senate Report of 1934:
Motor Carriers for hire penetrate everywhere and are engaged in intensive competition with each other, and with the railroads and water carriers.
This competition has been carried to an extreme which tends to undermine
the financial stability of the carriers and jeopardizes the maintenance of
transportation facilities and service appropriate to the needs of commerce
and required in the public interest. The competitive struggle is to a large
extent unequal and unfair, inasmuch as the railroads are completely
regulated... , and the interstate motor carriers are scarcely regulated
at all."

The ICC had called for an answer in a ruling in 1932 that said: "Substantial and
increasing rail-motor competition requires the proposed regulation in the public
interest, since the unrestrained competition is an impossible situation."'1
It was into this situation that the Motor Carrier Act (Interstate Commerce
Act Part II) was enacted in 1935."3 This regulated the competition between the
motor and rail carriers so as to foster the contributions each could make to the
over-all national transportation system. To effectuate the development of both,
the absorption of the new motor carrier industry by the established railroads was
guarded against. The ICC was instructed by the framers of the Act:
to allow acquisition (by the railroads of motor carrier concerns) which will
make for a coordinated and more economical service, and at the same time
to protect4 the public against monopolization of highway carriage by the
railroads.'

The rails did establish subsidiary motor carrier lines to connect the shipper
with the rail yard, but as to the independent motor carriers, coordination and its
consequent savings to shipper and public were dead letters. The rails refused to
work harmoniously with the motor carriers, and the latter were, they thought, in
no need of rail help. A 1938 ICC case pointed this out with a touch of humor:
The railway goes so far, indeed, as to suggest that if it contemplated retirement -from the handling of merchandise traffic, it could do so more gracefully and at less expense than by entering into joint arrangements with
"it
the parallel competing truck lines, from which the railway is convinced
could reasonably expect no bona fide coordination or cooperation."'15

During this period, the motor carriers were taking an especially large share
8 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
9 Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operations, 140 I.C. C. 685, 719 (1928).

10 DRAYTON, Transportationunder Two Masters 67 (1946).
11 S.REP. No. 482, 74th CONG., 1st Sess. (1935).

12 Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 379 (1932).
13 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-400 (1958).
14 79 CONG. REc. 5655 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wheeler). Senator Wheeler concluded:
"We try . . . to take away any fear that might exist in the minds of some that the motor
busses and trucks were going to be regulated in the interest of the railroads. I think such
fears were absolutely unfounded."
15 Kansas City Southern Transit Co., Common Carrier Application, 10 M.C.C. 221, 235
(1938).
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of the national market in "high-rate" goods, i.e., goods shipped in quantities less
than a carload and goods which would not stand a large amount of handling."
One commentator has suggested the following reasons for these inroads by the
trucking concerns:
In attempting to compete with the truckers, the railroads have been

handicapped in two important respects: (1) by the loss of time in handling

freight cars through large terminals, and (2) by the added cost to the

consignor or consignee when either or both are located off-track in the
handling of freight to and from the railroad freight house or team track

service.'

7

It was further observed by this commentator that: "Piggybacking service provides a means of overcoming both handicaps.""' Piggybacking or trailer-on-flatcar service in its most fundamental form is the interchange of trailers, loaded or
empty, between motor vehicles and rail flat cars.' 9 In all instances, motor vehicle
traffic moving in TOFC service is moving in transport trailers normally utilized
by motor carriers in highway service, but loaded on flat cars normally utilized in
the provision of service by rail. In most instances the motor carrier highway service
is involved in the origination of such traffic prior to the loading of the trailers on
rail flat cars and some motor carrier highway service is involved in the subsequent
delivery of the traffic after the trailers are unloaded from the rail flat cars. The
latter operation is the only type involved in the present proceeding.
Interchange is not something new, having been used sparingly between rail
and water in the middle of the last century. 20 However, for present purposes, piggybacking may be considered to have started with the Chicago and Great Western
Railway in 1936. The railroad entered into an agreement with a common carrier
by motor vehicle to transport the latter's trailers from the former's yards in Chicago
to the Twin Cities, where the motor carrier would once more haul the trailers to
the specific destinations in and around the Twin Cities. A petition to the Interstate
Commerce Commission for authority to post a tariff, i.e., a schedule of rates or
2
charges, covering the rail segment of the combined transportation was submitted. '
Competing rail and motor carriers immediately posed objections as to the rates
sought, which were well below the standard all-rail rates. The motor carriers
objected that the Great Western would need a motor carrier authority to transport
highway trailers. The Commission rejected the objectors' arguments and piggybacking became part of a legal transportation policy.
Since then, TOFC has become a growing source of revenue for the railroads.
Approximately $166,000,000 was realized through its use in 1959,22 and use of the
service increased 115% in the two years following 1958.23 From the Great Western,
the furnishing of this service had spread to a total of sixty-one first-class railroads
as of June, 1961.24

The nation-wide changes in transportation from the first Interstate Commerce
16 See Williams, Some Aspects of the Problem of Intercarrier Competition, 11 VAND. L.
REV. 971, 975-80 (1958), for an analysis of rail rate structure and motor carrier competition.
17 Fox, Trailer-on-flat-car Rates, 28 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 833-34 (1961).
18 Id. at 834.
19
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REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION POLICY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, 652 (Comm. Print. 1961).
20 From 1843 to 1857 sectionalized canal boats were transported on flat cars between

Philadelphia and Columbia, Pennsylvania. In 1885 and thereafter for several years, the
Long Island Railroad operated the so-called Farmer's Trains between Long Island points and
the East River, carrying four loaded produce wagons per flat car with the teams riding along
in specially constructed boxcars.

21
22

Trucks on Flat Cars between Chicago and Twin Cities, 216 I.C.C. 435 (1936).
Fox, Trailer-on-flat-carRates, 28 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 835 (1961).

24

"Piggyback Routing Guide," Distribution Age, Oct. 1960, p. 99.

23 SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON TRANSPORTATION POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 'COMMERCE, 87TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION POLICY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, 652 (Comm. Print. 1961).
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Act until today are particularly evident in automobile hauling. The business of
hauling automobiles during the early years of that invention was the domain of
the rails. With the expansion of motor carriers, their adaptability to transporting
new automobiles was soon recognized. The merits of this system from a practical
standpoint were pointed out in the Andrew Clark- Extension of Authority case,
wherein it was said:
The dealers who testified herein expressed a preference for motor
carrier transportation because it enables them to receive cars at their place
of business completely assembled, lubricated, and ready to deliver. Cars
shipped by rail must be unloaded by the dealers, which requires considerable labor. At many points, in particular the smaller towns, inadequate
terminal facilities entail additional time and labor in unloading the cars.
After unloading, cars transported by rail must be towed to the dealers'
garages for oil, gasoline, and occasionally25 some servicing, such as installation of bumpers, wheels, and other parts.

The inherent advantages of motor carrier transportation of automobiles led
to a rush of competing carriers to service Detroit and the other motor capitals
of the Midwest. The resultant duplication of facilities was contrary to the policy
of the Motor Carrier Act.
Under the so-called "grandfather clause" of the Act, 26 the number of authorities granted for interstate motor vehicle transportation was limited to the number
of truckers in active business at a date one year prior to the enactment of the bill.
But even at the critical date, the number of carriers in the automobile hauling
industry was excessive, so that a further limitation was deemed necessary. The
following year, the Interstate Commerce Commission grouped all property carriage
27
into four categories, determined according to the service offered by the carrier.
By definition, automobile haulage would fall into groups C and D (irregular radial
movements and irregular non-radial movements, respectively). In 1937, the ICC
ruled that transportation of new cars was usually a C movement, i.e., "over irregular routes from a fixed base point or points to points or places located within such
radial area as shall have been fixed and authorized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission." 28 The transportation of used and repossessed cars was defined as
between unlimited points
a D movement, i.e., "generally territorial in scope and 29
of origin and destination within designated boundaries."
That the distinction between the two types of movements depended on the
fixed originating point or lack of it is seen clearly in a 1944 ICC decision:
25 Andrew Clark - Extension of Authority, 16 M.C.C. 535, 537 (1939).
26 49 Stat. 551 §§ 206(a), 209(a) (1935); 49 U.S.C. §§ 306(a), 309(a) (1958).
§ 306(a) reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, and in section 310 of this
title, no common carrier by motor vehicle subject to the provisions of this
chapter shall engage in any interest or operation on any public highway,
or within any reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a certificate of
public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such
operations. Provided, however, that subject to section 310 of this title, if
any such carrier or predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation as a
common carrier by motor vehicle on June 1, 1935 on the route or routes
within the territory for which application is made and has so operated since
that time, or if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only was in bona fide
operation on June 1, 1935, during the season ordinarily covered by its operation, and has so operated since that time, except in either instance as to
interruption of service.over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall issue such certificate without
requiring further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served
by such operation, and without further, proceedings.
27 Classification of Motor Carriers of Property in the Matter of the Classification of
Brokers and Motor Carriers of Property, 2 M.C.C. 703, 709-11 (1937).
28 49 C.F.R. § 165.1(c) (1937).
52 M.C.C. 296, 301 (1950).
29 Howard Sober, Inc. Extension -California,
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[The] authorities have carefully maintained the distinction between radial
and non-radial service. To our knowledge, in no instance has radial authority been granted with the understanding that through service between
points in the radial territory via a point in the base territory was permitted
or authorized. The motor carrier industry has developed under the general
understanding that certificates authorizing radial operations do not authorize the holder thereof to perform cross haul operations by transportation
between points in the radial territory.3 0
In 1938, the Commission handed down an administrative ruling defining the
two types of authority in regard to the automobile hauling carriers."' The terms
used were initial and secondary authority, but they corresponded to the radial and
non-radial movements that governed the entire area -of motor carrier transportation. So, the Commission defined the two as follows:
The term "Initial movements" means transportation of new motor
vehicles from a place of manufacture or assembly, specifically authorized to
be served as a point of origin by the originating carrier's certificate, or
permit, to any point or place upon the authorized route or within its defined territory for delivery to consignee or to a connecting carrier.
The term "Secondary movement" means transportation of motor
vehicles, except transportationof new motor vehicles from a place of manufacture or assembly, by a carrier to, from, and between all points and places
upon its authorized route or routes or within its authorized territory for
delivery to consignee or connecting carriers. Such movements also include
cross movements, back hauls, and movements to and from body and specialty plants
upon the route or routes or within the authorized territory of the
32
carrier.
This ruling governed the automobile hauling industry without question as to
its meaning for almost twenty years. The "initial movement" carrier would perform the long haul from the manufacturer to the distributor or large dealers.
The secondary authority holder would perform the final distribution, if any were
needed, and transport used and repossessed cars. But at the end of the 1950's,
the possibility of adapting TOFO to the automobile hauling business was fully
appreciated for the first time. Since the cars were in themselves mobile, there was
no difficulty in transporting them from highway to rail and back.3 3 The rate savings
of twenty-five per cent and more convinced shippers that they should request their
carriers to enter into arrangements with the railroads for a trailer-on-flat-car service.
It must be noted here that the automobile manufacturers were using both
common carriers and contract carriers by motor vehicle. A common carrier is a
quasi-public agency that furnishes transportation to any and all members of the
public who desire such service, while a contract carrier does not furnish transportation indiscriminately, but only to those with whom it sees fit to contract.3 4 While
both in the present instance are performing the same work, the common carriers
are not under as strict a regulation as the contract carriers, nor are the contract
3 5
carriers afforded all the privileges of the common carriers.
.
The agreements call for TOFC service to be utilized under various plans. In
some instances, the traffic moves by motor common carriers and under rate schedules published by such common carriers, although en route the motor carrier
utilizes the TOFC service offered by the railroad. Such substitution of TOFC
service for a portion of the highway haul is provided for in the tariff. Thus, the
motor carrier receives its publicized transportation charges from the shipper and
remits to the participating rail carriers an unpublished division of the single factor
motor carrier rate. This is Plan I. It is to be noted that under this plan the
30 G & M Motor Transfer Co., Common Carrier Application, 43 M.C.C. 497, 503-04
(1944). See also, Carraway, Motor Carrier Operating Authorities, 11 VAND. L. REV. 1029,
1043 (1958).
31 Administrative Ruling No. 75, FED. CAPR. REP. 25075, at 26151 (July 15, 1938).
32 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
33 Fox, Trailer-on-flat-carRates, 28 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 836 (1961).
34 Mt. Tom Motor Lines v. McKesson & Robbins, 325 Mass. 45, 89 N.E.2d 3, 5-6, (1949).
35 Holmes Contract Carrier Application, 8 M.C.C. 391 (1938).
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shipper does not share in the cost reduction effected by the substitution.
In other instances, the rail carriers publish ramp to ramp rates and the motor
carriers transport traffic to and from the railroads at the motor carrier rates and
the railroad transports the same traffic between its ramps at the rail rate. Thus, the
railroad receives its published rate rather than an unpublished division of the
motor carrier's single factor rate. This is Plan 3.
A third variation, known as Plan 5, occurs where the motor common carrier
and the railroad publish joint rates covering motor carrier and TOFC service.
The physical aspects of the coordinated motor-rail-motor operations under
the three plans do not differ materially, but there is considerable difference in the
methods of billing, the identity of the shippers involved, and the imposition of
liability for loss or damage to the cargo. The legal significance of the differences
among these plans, as viewed by the parties on both sides and the Hearing Examiner, will be seen in subsequent discussion. These three plans are the only ones
available for use within the confines of the "initial movement" limitation.
Typical of the agreements entered into by the automobile hauling industry
is the service provided by the Dixie Transport Company and the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad. Under this operation, Dixie would pick up the motor vehicles
at the Studebaker-Packard factory in South Bend, Indiana, transport them to
Cincinnati, Ohio, there load the trailers on flatcars of the L&N, from where the
loaded cars would move to Atlanta, Georgia, where the loaded trailers would be
removed from the flatcars and transported by Dixie to ultimate destinations in
Florida and Georgia. Dixie's authority was both initial and secondary from South
Bend to all points in Florida and Georgia.
Dixie, however, had brought a proceeding before a Hearing Examiner in
which it voluntarily sought a cerificate of public convenience and necessity for
initial and secondary rights from the rail terminal points to the destinations served,
apparently believing that some additional authority would be required.38 Protesting
competing carriers challenged the right of Dixie to transport the vehicles over an
entirely different route than that authorized on Dixie's certificate. Secondly, they
asserted that the railroad carriage segment of the transportation terminated the
initial authority of Dixie. The plan used being a Plan I operation, the L&N was
quick to point out that under this system, the rail service was merely substituted
for Dixie's highway haul, and that Dixie actually remained the carrier for the
entire trip; thus, the initial authority was not ended by the rail portion of the
shipment.
The decision in this case, as well as the decision in another involving essentially
the same question, was rendered in 1960.
In Dixie Transport Company-Extension-Several States,37 the Examiner recommended a denial of the application on the ground that public convenience and
necessity had not been established. During the course of the public hearing, it
was developed that Dixie was already engaged in the provision of transportation
service involving TOFC movement between rail terminal points intermediate to
the point of automobile manufacturer and the ultimate consignee. The Examiner
ruled that the TOFC service so employed was unlawful inasmuch as the motor
carrier had no authority to serve Cincinnati nor to serve Atlanta from Cincinnati.
In the other case, Convoy Company Extension - Rail-for-Motor Service, 8 the
applicant was using TOFC service between California and Utah, holding only
initial authority to serve these points. The Hearing Examiner wrote:
[I]t would appear that applicant, upon publication of appropriate tariff

provisions for substitution of rail service, might lawfully conduct the proposed operations under its presently effective rights. The matter of
36 Dixie Transport Company - Extension (1960).
37 Ibid.
38 MC- 52858 Sub. 78 (1960).

Several States, MC

-

88300 Sub. 24
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whether the proposed service lawfully may be performed under presently
effective rights, of course, would depend on whether issuance of a bill of
lading by applicant at the assembly plant covering transportation by motor
vehicle to final destination would fix the identity of the shipment from the
39
plant to final destination as an initial movement.

Here, again, there was involved a Plan I operation and the Examiner evidently
accepted the argument of the railroads entering in support of the petition that
the rail portion of the transportation was not as a connecting carrier, but merely
as a substitute for the motor carrier.
The decision in this case, as well as the Dixie decision, was pending before
the Commission at the time the petition of the National Automobile Transporters
Association was submitted. 40 Because of the conflicting opinions, the motor carriers
refrained from further use of the piggyback services, unless they possessed the
requisite secondary authority to serve the intermediate points. The whole question
of further adaptation of piggybacking to automobile hauling was kept in abeyance
pending the outcome of the petition.
In reality, what is desired, by the petition is a redefinition of Administrative
Ruling No. 75 as to the interpretation of the last phrase thereof, viz., "or to a
connecting carrier."41 If the railroad is a connecting carrier in TOFC arrangements, as understood by the term in the ruling, the initial authority of the motor
carrier terminates at that point where the trailers are loaded onto the flatcars.
Consequently, the motor carrier is violating his authority certificate inasmuch as
he is performing initial movement only from point A to B, and not to D as the
authority requires.
The Hearing Examiner's decision was a denial of the NATA petition. In so
doing, the Examiner wrote:
Regardless of which of the so-called rail TOFC plans are [sic] described in Appendix B is used, the conclusion is inescapable that the motor
and rail participants are, in fact, connecting carriers, and it is immaterial
whether the vehicles move on joint through rates, or a combination of
local rates. . . . In addition to requiring authority to serve the intermediate points at which the traffic is turned over to or received from the
railroad, the motor carrier must have initial authority from the point of
initial origin to the point of transfer to the rail carrier, and secondary
movement authority from the point at which the
4 2 traffic is received from
the railroad to the point of ultimate destination.

There is no doubt that the forthcoming decision on the Hearing Examiner's
recommended order will have far-reaching effects on the automobile haulers. The
Commission is well aware of this, for in Auto Convoy Co. Extension - Secondary
Movements from Texas Points,4 3 the opinion noted the upcoming decision on the
petition for the declaratory order in these words:
Until recently, authorized motor carriers transported the bulk of the
traffic from assembly plants to final destinations in initial or combined
initial-secondary movements. Much of the long haul traffic now moves by
rail. Cut off from the over the road service for long distances, the established automobile transporters are forced to rely on traffic moving to points
within relatively short distances of the assembly plants, or to the traffic
which has been moved by rail for the major portion of its journey to a
destination requiring only a short haul movement to th6 distributor. Most
of the established carriers have a large investment in special equipment
and plant facilities which are lying idle. Certainly, in the auto transport
business, there needs to be a clarification of basic principles to serve as
guidelines to those holding authorities no longer useful to shippers, and to
39 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
40 MC-O 3024, Sept. 30, 1960.
41 Administrative Ruling No. 75, FED. GAR. REP. 1125075, at 26151 (July 15, 1938).
42 National Automobile Transporters Association Petition for Declaratory Order, Order of
the Hearing Examiner, MO-C 3024, July 20, 1961.
43 No. MC 108121, July 25, 1961.
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those who
may be induced to seek modifications of rights or even new
44

grants.

The Commission, in deciding the petition, will have no precedents precisely
on this point upon which to rely. But there are previous cases dealing with the
problems of interchange between carriers, TOFC service, and the automobile hauling
industry in general.
The landmark case on the practice of TOFO service is Movement of Highway
Trailers by Rail,4 5 better known as the "New Haven Questionnaire." The controversy arose over the use of TOFC service by the New Haven Railroad. Under an
Examiner's disallowance of the service, the railroad ceased the arrangements in
force and submitted twelve questions to the Commission regarding the legal relations, limitations, and obligations incident to the transportation of highway trailers
on flatcars. The answers given- by the' Commission were a compendium of the
earlier decisions dealing with TOFC service. The findings included holdings of
previous decisions that "piggybacking" is rail and not motor transportation; 46
common carriers by motor vehicle may enter into joint rate agreements with railroads,47 while private and contract carriers may not;48 and that these rules do 49not
apply when the prior motor transportation is within a "terminal area" solely.
The questions posed which immediately touch on the issues raised in the
petition are as follows:
Question No. 7(a): As between a railroad and a motor common
carrier whose loaded and empty trailers are moving in the railroad's
trailer-on-flat-car service, is the relation that
of connecting carriers where
50

the arrangement is for substituted service?
The C6mmission answered with an unqualified "yes." What the Commission went
on to say about the obligations of the two carriers necessarily follows such a construction of the relationship described:
Although the railroads are under no obligation to police the operations of
the motor carriers with respect to their certificates, we believe that when
they eater into joint rate agreements with such carriers they should satisfy
themselves that the motor carriers have authority to operate with respect
to the commodities between the points where the substituted service is per51
formed.

In regard to the use of the different plans of TOFC service offered by the
railroads, it has been seen that joint rate agreements (Plan 5) were not questioned.
Question No. 4 considered Plan 3 in the following words:
Under the conditions stated in question 3, (under provisions of tariffs
duly published, but without holding any .authority under Part II of the
Act) may a railroad transport such trailers if the prior and/or
52 subsequent
highway movement is by a common carrier by motor vehicle?

The Commission answered the question in the negative, saying:
If the railroad is on notice that the trailers tendered it in this manner are
being operated in common carrier service subject to Part II of this Act, it

should not thus53knowingly join with the motor common carrier in a violation of the law.

Neither of these holdings was unexpected. They were merely a restatement of
the law governing TOFO since the first case dealing with the subject came before
the Commission in 1936. In this case, Trucks on Flat Cars between Chicago and
44 Ibid.
45 293 I.C.C. 93 (1954).

46 Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, 292 I.C.C. 93, 103 (1954), answer to question No. 1.
47 Id. at 105, answer to question No. 5.
48 Ibid.
49 Id. at 103, answer to question No. 2..
50 Id. at 107.
51 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
52 Id. at 103.
53 Ibid.
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the Twin Cities,54 the Commission allowed the Great Western Railway to conduct
the TOFC service over the route that the participating motor carrier was certified
to serve under an open tariff (Plan 3) on the theory that the motor carrier was
still the carrier from beginning to end of the entire journey and that the carrier
was acting as the "shipper" during the rail segment.
But this justification of Plan 3 service by use of the fiction that the carrier
was carrier-throughout and shipper-part-way was found repugnant to the spirit
of the Motor Carrier Act and consequently overturned in the Substituted Freight
Case55 three years later. In that case, mention was also made of Plan 1 operations
in the following:
[W]here a common carrier by motor vehicle substantially abandons its over
the road service between any points on its route, it runs the risk of having
its certificates revoked in whole or in part.... The furnishing of the socalled substitute service without setting forth the service, the routes over
which it is performed, and the parties performing same in lawfully filed
tariffs is in contravention of sections 216-217 (Motor Carrier Act) and our
regulations thereunder. 5 6

Thus, the Commission was equating Plan 1 with Plan 5 in the relationship of the
two carriers.
On the same point of relationship, perhaps the clearest expression of the Commission's thinking was given in Motor-Rail-Motor Traffic in the East and Midwest." There, the Great Western Railway again filed a tariff for proposed motorrail-motor joint rates, using the corresponding rates of the motor carrier for highway transportation for the same distance (a Plan 1 operation). The Commission,
in answering the objection that it is unlawful for the motor carrier to substitute
a new route over rails, made the following comment:
This argument assumes that under the proposed arrangement the
status of the respondent motor carrier with respect to the rail portion of
the transportation would be that of shipper. Nothing in the evidence warrants this assumption. The motor carriers status is that of a connecting
carrierunder a joint rate agreement which is specifically authorized by law.
The wovel way in which the traffic is handled 58does not affect the status of
the participating carriers in that arrangement.

In point of fact, the only decision that has shown a different viewpoint as to
the relationship between the carriers is the Gilbert Carrier Corp. Extension Kearney, N.J.5 9 case, where the Commission ruled that "As the proposed service
is a substitute for the all-motor service which the applicant is now authorized to
perform, it cannot be considered as distinct and separate therefrom, but rather as
complementary and non-severable."60 Here, it must be noted that the controversy
was not concerned with automobile hauling and the Commission did, in spite of
this quotation, take it upon itself to grant a new authorization for the motor carrier to serve the rail yard, thus indicating that the old authority for the over-all
transport would not cover the initial truck movement to the rail head in a city
outside the area encompassed in the original authority.
The Commission, in the 1961 Auto Convoy Co. case referred to above accepts
this conclusion as to the need of new authority to serve the rail head:
The contention of protestants at the hearing that, under initial authority
to serve both origin and destination points, they could provide service by
means of TOFC (trailer-on-flat-car) Plan 1, even though not authorized to
serve either rail origin or destination point finds no support in present Commission precedents.6 '
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216 I.C.C. 435 (1936).
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232 I.C.C. 683 (1939).

56

Id. at 690-91.
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219 I.C.C. 245 (1936).

58 Id. at 274. (Emphasis added.)
59 72 M.C.C. 204 (.1957).
60 Id. at 206.
61 Auto Convoy Co. Extension Secondary Movements from Texas Points, No. MC
108121, July 25, 1961. (Emphasis added.)

LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
This twofold conclusion of the law as it stands today-that the status of the
carriers engaging in TOFC together is that of connecting carriers and not that of
shipper and agent, and that as connecting carriers, both must have authority to
serve the point of interchange- does not necessarily defeat the position of the
petitioner. The cases were not dealing with the question of initial and secondary
authorities, and the petitioner contends that, because of this, the cases cited may
be distinguished from the instant proceedings. Nor does the phrase "connecting
carrier" have the same meaning today that it did when Administrative Ruling
No. 75 was issued. As has been seen, the coordination of railroad and motbr transportation facilities was virtually nonexistent before the arrival of TOFC. The
petitioners seize upon this fact to argue that the subject of Administrative Ruling
No. 75 was interchange between two motor carriers or two railroads, and not
between railroads and motor carriers. 62 This present arrangement of rail movement acting for motor movement was something unforeseen in 1938 and so must
be decided upon new considerations, and not on the law as it describes conditions
then existing.
There is certainly strength behind this argument and no one, not even the
objectors to the petition, would deny that a great change has occurred in the past
few years. But there were instances in the past where motor carriers hauling automobiles have interchanged cargo with another carrier, e.g., cars have been shipped
by boat from Michigan to Milwaukee and Duluth,63 and the subsequent motor
vehicle transportation was always required by the Commission to be under secondary authority. It may be said that this era of piggybacking is not so much a
revolution as a development, astounding and unprecedented to be sure, but a
development nonetheless of a practice already judged in terms of initial and secondary authority.
The petitioners contend that the purpose of Administrative Ruling No. 75
was to
protect the initial authority holders and not to limit their field of operations. 64 This is shown clearly, they argue, in the quantity of proof demanded by
the Commission in granting initial authorities, much more than was needed for
the granting of a secondary authority. Secondary authority was never predicated
on the fact that the secondary carriers would play an appreciable role in the transportation of new cars and so the procedures were made simpler.
While this may be true in regard to the conceptions of the original Commission, it is well known that at this time secondary carriers are carrying much of
the 'new automobile traffic. 6- A denial of the petition would, of course, increase
their business, but in no sense would it give the secondary carriers an entrance
into a field where they have never been.
The petitioner argues that public interest demands the granting of the petition.
Shippers of automobiles and railroads have for the most part joined the proceedings
as intervenors in behalf of the petition. The shippers' interest is due to the fact
that the motor carriers now making the initial movements have serviced them
long and well and are experienced in the handling of their product. Another reason
for the shippers' interest is the amount of procedural difficulties that will fall 'on
them if the petition is denied. The brief of the Ford Motor Company brings this
out:
62 Brief of National Automobile Transporters Association in No. MC-C 3024, October
24, 1960, p. 25.
63 Brief of Clark Transport Company, Intervenor in Opposition in MC-C 3024, October
24, 1960, p. 10.
64 Brief of National Automobile Transporters Association in No. MC-C 3024, October
24, 1960.
65 Frank Porterfield, of Convoy Company, an intervenor in opposition, testified at the
oral hearing that $22,000,000 has been derived by his company in secondary operations
in the past thirteen years. Further, he testified that his concern has spent over $1,000,000

in acquiring facilities to perform distribution of piggyback traffic.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Ford, in order to assure itself that it would have suitable motor carrier service to carry out the distribution of automobiles after completing the rail portion of TOFO services, has been obliged to communicate with the Commission on no less than 17 occasions in support of various motor carrier
requests for temporary secondary authority
or requests for the renewal of a
66
secondary authority about to expire.
The railroads have joined in asking for the granting of the petition because
of the immediate fuller use of TOFC service that would result. But all the railroads have expressed uneasiness over any extension of the petition to any other
than a Plan 1 arrangement. Plan 3, they fear, may be illegal under the New Haven
rulings, and Plan 5 has always concerned itself with connecting carriers. Thus,
the railroads pay lip service to the theory that Administrative Ruling No. 75 was
intended to prevent just that.
The petitioner's final argument is not based on law or new interpretations of
older decisions. It rests firmly on logical grounds and perhaps is the best argument advanced for the granting of the requested order. The initial authority holders
were always able to transport the automobiles from the manufacturing site to the
distributor. Until approximately two years ago this was all done by highway
transportation. Now, the argument runs, are they not doing the very same thing,
even though substituting a rail shipment for part of the formerly all-highway
journey? The change in mode of transportation is merely accomplishing the end
which the initial authority holder was providing at all times since the distinction
between initial and secondary authority was made. Nor are the secondary authority
holders losing anything, as the initial movement was always as complete a service
as the proposed TOFC service will be. The petitioner also brings out the fact
that the selection of who will receive the cars at the rail unloading point will be
in the hands of the shipper, and if the shipper feels that secondary carriers should
perform the
final lap of the journey, the granting of the petition will not hinder
67
his choice.
In this question of whether the granting of the petition will cause a loss of
traffic to the secondary authority holders, the secondary carriers take the position
that it will. It appears that it would cause some loss where the -secondary carrier
is now operating as the receiver of the automobiles at the rail unloading point,
but these situations are infrequent as compared with the majority of secondary
carriers who concern themselves almost exclusively with used and repossessed cars.
Perhaps it might be argued that the granting of the petition would allow the
initial carriers to furnish complete service facilities at points far removed from
their present facilities at or near the manufacturing site, and in so doing allow
them to expand their business to small dealers, which at present they are not
servicing, thus taking away the only business the majority of secondary carriers
have in regard to new cars. The Commission will be faced with ascertaining all
the facts in this matter to determine the validity of the petitioner's plea.
Besides this main issue at point in the petition, the entrance of intervenors
both on behalf and in opposition to the petition have injected numerous related

66 Brief of Ford Motor Company, intervenor in behalf of the petition in MC-C 3024,
October 24, 1960, pp. 10-11.
67 Brief of the National Automobile Transporters Association in MC-C 3024, October
24, 1960. While this argument is based on logic primarily, there are decisions that accept
the position offered. The Commission has granted new authorities to established carriers
where they are "following the business." So, in Petroleum Transport Co. Extension - UmatilIa, 19 M.C.C. 637, 639 (1939), the Commission ruled: "In the circumstances, it is our
opinion that we should view the issues herein as merely permitting the applicant to continue
to perform the same service as it has heretofore." Accord, Helms Express, Inc., 67 M.C.C.
183 (1956).
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issues into the proceedings. Two especially seem to be worthy of mention here.
General Motors, appearing in behalf of the petition, is unique in that it alone is
dependent on contract carrier service for the distribution of its automobiles. Thus,
General Motors has construed the petition as asking for permission for their contract carriers to make use of TOFC service. As has been seen, the granting of
the petition 'in behalf of the common carriers would demand the overruling of
many Commission precedents; in regard to contract carriers, the precedents are
even more opposed.
In Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail,68 the question of contract carrier
participation in TOFC service was answered. The Commission determined:
[W]e are of the view that a contract carrier may not utilize trailer-on-flatcar service to obtain transportation within the scope of its [the contract
carrier's] permit. For example, a contract carrier of specified commodities,
authorized to perform such transportation from Portsmouth, N.H., to New
York over a route through Boston, could not lawfully divert his vehicle at
69
Boston to trailer-on-flat-car service between that point and New York.

The Commission was following the general thesis held in an earlier case,
Holmes Contract Carrier Application.7 0 There, upon a request by a contract
carrier to authorize interchange movements with rail carriers, the Commission
decided:
[A] contract carrier is under certain disabilities in its relations with common
carriers. It may not engage in interchange with common carrers; inter.change is appropriate between common carriers only. We see nothing to
prevent a shipper from employing a contract carrier, apart from its contract
of carriage, as its agent for the purpose of arranging for transportation by
common carrier beyond points reached by the 7 contract
carrier, including
1
payment of the charges for such transportation.

One of the often-cited reasons for this prohibition on contract carriers is that
the shipper has contracted with the carrier that it should perform the transportation for him and that to transfer the cargo to a common carrier for part of the
distance would breach that contract.7 2 This argument could not stand up in the
present case as General Motors wants the contract carrier to interchange. But the
argument, it is submitted, is and was, a subterfuge for the feeling, rightly held, that
the purpose of the Motor Carrier Act was the protection of common carriers from
the encroachments of contract carriers.73
It would appear that any attempt of the intervenors to reopen this question
of contract carrier participation in TOFO service will meet with the Commission's
disapproval. On June 6, 1960, the NATA filed a petition for a reconsideration
of the holdings in the New Haven case and the Commission denied the petition
on the grounds that the law on the matter is settled and there is no reason for
reopening the question. 4
Another related issue of special note which has been injected into this proceeding is the contention by NATA and the manufacturers of automobiles repre68 293 I.C.C. 93 (1954).
69 Id. at 103-04.

70 8 M.C.C. 391 (1938).

71 Id. at 392-93.
72 Iron and Steel Articles - Eastern Common Carriers, 305 I.C.C. 369, 374 (1959).
73 In Gollock Application for Extension of Operations, 1 M.C.C. 161, 165 (1936), this
principle was alluded to on the extension of a contract carriers certificate of authority:
There is force in this protestant's view that common carriers, since they
undertake to service the 'general public, should be protected against the
contract carriers who take the cream of the traffic and thus make it difficult
for the common carriers to continue their broader operations.
74 Petition For Leave to Intervene in Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail for Reopening, for Oral Hearing, and for Reconsideration, Docket No. 31375, March 1, 1960.
Denied on June 8, 1960.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
sented that all forms of TOFC are the same, and if one plan is allowed, all should
be. As of the time the controversy began, all three plans were in use by different
motor companies. The petitioner alleges that the only distinction between the
plans is one of form, and the actual participation is identical.
It is this issue, seemingly put forward as a mere afterthought to the principal
issue at hand, that has caused the intervention in the proceedings of the freight
forwarders and at least one railroad.7 5 For if the construction of TOFC plans
advanced by the petitioner is accepted by the Commission, the conclusion would
not be restricted to the automobile hauling field of transportation, but would be
extended to all motor carrier companies.
At the present time, Plan 3 is restricted to the use of shippers, freight forwarders, and private carriers. This is so because of the very nature of the plan,
i.e., a proffering of all-rail service to a shipper or his agent in their vehicles. A common carrier cannot by law be the agent of the shipper, nor is a contract carrier
an agent where it will deliver the goods and receive them back from the railroad,
assuming full responsibility for the goods for the entire joumey.76 Allowance of
Plan 3 service would, it is contended, constitute the carrier by motor vehicle as
shipper and thus subject the railroad to accepting goods offered in this way,
whether they agreed to the arrangement or not -because of their common carrier
status.

Many railroads refuse to engage in Plan 1 service with motor common carriers
because the plan leaves full responsibility and receipt of payment in the hands of
the motor carrier, thus rendering the railroads liable to another carrier. The rails
in general favor the use of Plan 5 TOFC service and that only in regard to motor

common carriers. Any of the other plans, they feel, will violate section 216 of the
Motor Carrier Act, 7 allowing them, at their discretion only, to enter into piggybacking arrangements.
The Special Study Group on Transportation Policies in the United States

recommends a more wide spread use of piggybacking.75 They favor its extension
along Plan 5 lines believing Plan 1 to be disadvantageous because of its unpublished division of charges, which circumvents the policy of open rates requirements
for common carriers. Plan 3, they feel, should be limited to shippers, freight forwarders, and private carriers, and should be developed only to check the diversion
seems to have been accepted
of traffic to private carriers. This latter conclusion
79
by the Commission in a case earlier this year.
75 The St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad intervened in its own behalf in the present
proceedings. The "Frisco" was one of the original railroads offering TOFC service. In oral
hearing on the petition, it declared itself as allowing service only under a Plan 5 arrangement.
76 Brief of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Company, Inc., intervenor in No. MC-a
3024.
77 49 Stat. 558 §§ 216(c) (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(c) (1958), which reads:
Common carriers of property by motor vehicle may establish through
rates and joint rates, charges, and classifications with other such carriers or
In case of such joint
with common carriers by rail, or express, or water ....
rates, fares, or charges, itshall be the duty of the carriers thereto to establish just and reasonable regulations and practices in connection therewith,
and just, reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof as between the carriers
participating therein which shall not unduly prefer or prejudice any of
the participating carriers.
78 SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON TRANSPORTATION POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE, 87TH CONG., 1ST. SESS.,
REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION POLICY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT, 668-78 (Comm. Print. 1961).

Therein it was stated: "We recommend that Congress express its intention that rigid interpretation of the Act [Interstate Commerce Act] not operate to bar progress. We recommend
that regulatory agency make full use of existing powers . . . to accomplish these objectives."
79 Eastern Central Motor Carrier Association, Inc. v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., No.
MC - 32533, where, over the vigorous objections of the motor carriers, the Commission
approved full scale use of Plan 3 TOFC service by freight forwarders because of the benefits accruing to shippers and the public.
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While it may be advanced that the different plans of TOFC service may
result in the same physical participation of motor and rail carriers, the law seems
clear from the Movement of Highway Trailers on Flat Cars case80 that Plan 3 is
closed to the use of common carriers and contract carriers on pressing transportation policy grounds. Because of this and the fact that any such sweeping change
of existing Commission law would-require a hearing of all parties concerned, viz.,
all the interests which partake in any form of TOFC service in any area of transportation, any decision on the matter of the petition will not include an affirmance
of this position of the petitioner.
In concluding, it may be noted that the issues involved in the petition are
many and complex. As to the incidental issues described, there is little chance
that the Commission will reverse its prior decisions and grant the interpretation
request. As to the central issue restricted to the area of automobile hauling, any
forecast must be of a much less certain tone. The denial of the petition will slow
down the full utilization of piggybacking in this area, a result most transportation
analysts would condemn. However, the loss would not be of an appreciable nature
and a denial would accord with the policies of the Commission in this area for
the past twenty years. It is for these reasons that it would appear that the petition
will be denied, and the Commission will do justice to the petitioners by granting
them secondary authority for those movements now conducted on initial authority
which follow the unloading of the trailers at the rail terminal point.
Charles J. Griffin
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
recently refused to enforce the award of a labor arbitrator on the grounds that he
exceeded his submission authority and based his decision on inadmissible evidence.
The dispute centered upon the discharge of an employee for allowing, as the Company termed it, "a cotton lap to run through a carding machine which he was supposed to be tending," resulting in damage to the machine and a waste of production. The discharge came after two previous reprimands for the same offense
and was based on "a long-standing policy in the 'card room' of discharge following
two warnings." After complying with the grievance procedure, the parties submitted the case to arbitration, which resulted in an award ordering suspension
without pay for one week and thereafter reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and with back pay up to a maximum of ninety days. When the Company
refused to abide by the award, the Union instituted this suit to compel compliance.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the refusal of the lower court to enforce the award,
holding that the arbitrator, under this particular contract, had no authority to
investigate and pass upon the propriety of the "Company's standards"; and that
even if he did have such authority his award would fail, because it appeared to
AGREEMENTS. -

be based on another arbitration case with the same Company in which a different arbitrator reprimanded the Company for its training programs and excessive

workloads. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local 1386 v. American
Thread Company, 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,1 the
Supreme Court of the United States delivered a mandate to the federal courts
that they should apply the policy of our national labor laws in order to formulate
a substantive law with respect to their jurisdiction and duties in interpreting arbitration clauses of collective bargaining agreements. On June 20, 1960, almost four
years to the day after Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court in a trio of cases de80 293 I.C.C. 93, 103-04 (1954), in answer to question No. 3.
1 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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termined the nature of this substantive law.2 The essence of this "Warrior frlogy,"
as these cases have come to be called, is that, according to our national labor policy,
the question of the arbitrability of a dispute is exclusively for the courts to decide
unless the parties have expressly contracted otherwise; that a decision on the merits
is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and must be reserved for him; and that
"An order to arbitrate the particular grievance [or to enforce the arbitration award]
should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."' The reason for this extension of the latitude given the arbitrators is a
recognition that collective bargaining agreements cannot be interpreted strictly as
are commercial contracts, and a realization that the tools of the arbitrator are
most suitable for such an interpretation.
The majority of the court in Textile Workers Union of America v. American
Thread Company4 evidently realized the sweeping quality of the words of the
Supreme Court in the Warrior trilogy, for an adequate and correct discussion of
these cases is presented in the opinion. 5 Also obvious from a reading of the
opinion, though not actually spelled out therein, is a disapproval of the award of
the arbitrator and of his conclusion as to the merits of the case. Desiring a ground
upon which to refuse to enforce the award of the arbitrator because of his feeling
of its patent injustice, and inoculated with judicial loyalty to the teachings of the
United States Supreme Court, Circuit Judge Boreman was forced to scrutinize
some of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement strictly, and completely disregard others, so that it could be said with "positive assurance" that the
dispute was not arbitrable.
This "judicial destruction" of the spirit of the collective bargaining agreement
begins with a quote from Article III of the agreement - the Management Rights
Section.6 To summarize the pertinent parts: The Company has the right of management, which includes the right to discipline or discharge for just cause; and
any action by the Company under this section can be subjected to the grievance
procedure, up to but not including arbitration, unless the agreement otherwise
provides. Add to this section the fact that the discharged employee had violated
a Company standard, and that Article IV, Section 1, defines "just cause' for
discipline or discharge as including the "failure of an employee to properly perform
his job in accordance with the Company standards,"r and you have a "reasonable"
argument that the type of penalty is up to the discretion of the Company and
positively not arbitrable. This "reasonable" argument is a prime example of the
reason courts have left the bulk of collective bargaining agreement interpretation
to the arbitrator - a close scrutiny of a single contract provision, without a consideration of other provisions and of exterior factors, can often result in an absurd conclusion. An example based on other provisions of this collective bargainmng agreement will illustrate this. Article IV, Section 1, also defines "just cause" for
discipline or discharge as including a "violation of valid plant rules" and a "failure
to obey instructions of supervisors";8 under Judge Boreman's interpretation of the
agreement, an employee who reports to work two minutes late could be validly
discharged.
2 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960). See also Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration, 36 NoTRaE DAME
LAWYER 138 (1961); Note, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 63 (1960).
3 United States Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
4 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 196't).
5 Id. at 897.
6 Ibid.
7 291 F.2d at 898 (4th Cir. 1961).
8 Ibid.
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The fallacies of this argument are adroitly pointed out by Chief Judge Sobeloff
in a dissenting opinion. He attacks the opinion of the majority on this point from
two angles. First, he points out the failure of the majority to differentiate between "just cause for discipline" and "just cause for discharge"; and secondly, he
are minor
indicates that other contract provisions are pertinent and that if they
provisions and can be disregarded, this decision is for the arbitrator. 9 Article IV,
Section 2, of the bargaining agreement provides that all cases of discharge or
discipline are subject to the grievance procedure, which contains arbitration as
a last step, and Section 3 of that same Article assumes the possibility of arbitration in the case of discipline or discharge, for it limits the arbitrator's award of
back pay to a period of ninety days. 10
Whether Chief Judge Sobeloff succeeded in proving that this dispute is clearly arbitrable is debatable; but he did point out that there is a contradiction in
the collective bargaining agreement, (or at the very least, an ambiguity), under
the "positive assurance" doctrine of the Warrior trilogy is enough to get the case
to the arbitrator for a decision on the merits."
As mentioned above, the majority also based their judgment on the arbitrator's reliance on inadmissible evidence, namely, another arbitrator's opinion in
a case with the same Company. While there are some old cases holding that an
award may be set aside for a manifest mistake of law or fact,12 which includes
the admission of improper evidence, the majority seem to hold that a mistake
of law or fact, without corruption or fraud, will not vitiate the award.1 3 Moreover, as Chief Judge Sobeloff points out, since the United States Supreme Court
stated in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,'4
the third case in the Warrior trilogy, that "Arbitrators have no obligation to the
court to give their reasons for an award,"' 5 it follows that these reasons cannot
be reviewed by the courts.
Having thus established that the opinion of the majority is without support
in the light of the Warrior trilogy, an interesting problem presents itself. Since
the courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of a particular
dispute;' 6 since they have to order arbitration of the merits unless there is "positive assurance" that the dispute is not arbitrable;' 7 and since they cannot review
the reasons for an arbitrator's decision,' is it possible for a dispute tobe arbitrated,
9 Local 95, Office Employees International Union v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Company,
287 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1961). In response to the Company's claim that certain clauses were
minor clauses and not pertinent, the court said at 456: "That argument merely points up a
patent ambiguity which may be resolved only by interpretation of the agreement as a whole,
...which is within the scope of the power expressly granted by the agreement to the arbitration board. .

....

10 Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1386 v. American Thread Company, 291
F.2d 894, 904 (4th Cir. 1961).
11 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960).
See Local 95, Office Employees International Union v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Com-

pany, 287 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1961); Maryland Telephone Union v. Chesapeake and Potomac

Telephone Company, 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960); Textile Workers Union of America
v. Cone Mills Corp., 188 F. Supp. 728 (M.D.N.C. 1960).
12 E.g., U.S. v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406 (1874).
13 Western Oil Fields, Inc. v. Rathbun, 250 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1958); United Fuel Gas
Company v. Columbia Fuel Corp., 165"F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1948).
14 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
15 Id. at 598.
16 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S.
574 (1960); Local 201, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v.
General Electric Company, 283 F.2d147 (1st Cir. 1960).
17 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U:S.
574, 582-83 (1960).
18 United Steelw6rkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Cop., 363 U.S. 593,
598 (1960).
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with the award being rendered and enforced, while the arbitrator actually lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter?
After many years of uncertainty and indecision, the federal courts were given
an idea as to their role in interpreting arbitration clauses of collective bargaining
agreements with the passage of Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.19 Due to the generality of this clause, however, divergent views
developed. One theory was that Section 301 (a) was enacted only to give jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases involving labor contracts and that it did not
give them any different or additional powers than a state court would have had
expressed
if the action had been brought there. 20 Contrary to this was the view
in Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Company,21 and adopted
by the majority of the courts, that Section 301 (a) was a directive to the federal
courts to develop a "federal common law" in connection with the rights of the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement, and that it authorized such courts tc
give specific performance of arbitration clauses contained in these agreements.
The United States Supreme Court settled this conflict among the circuits in
1957 with its opinion in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama.22 The Court adopted the view of Judge Wyzanski as expressed in the
American Thread case; arbitration was ordered, and the federal courts were directed to fashion a federal common law from the policy of our national labor laws.
This directive was followed by numerous articles on the role of the federal
courts in the interpretation of arbitration tlauses in collective bargaining agreements. Undoubtedly the most influential was an address given by Professor Archibald Cox at the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, and
printed in the Harvard Law Review.23 His article begins with an elaborate discussion of the characteristics of a collective bargaining agreeient, including how
it differs from an ordinary commercial contract, and how it "is the ultimate source
of the rights [of the parties], but . . . does not provide the actual criteria of decision." 24 The latter part of the article contains Professor Cox's solution to the
problem. He suggests that the conventional arbitration clause, a "wide-open"
clause, 25 "reserves the right to a judicial determination upon whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction over the subject matter but that all other questions procedural, jurisdictional or substantive - are solely within the power of the
arbitrator to determine,"29 and that "Since the true nature of a grievance often
cannot be determined until there is a full hearing upon the facts, the reasonable
course is to send all doubtful cases to arbitration, reserving the right to vacate any
award which indisputably goes beyond the scope of the agreement."17
Insofar as this solution gives to both the arbitrator and the courts the work
19 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958): "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to

the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
20 Mercury Oil Refining Company v. Oil Workers International Union, 187 F.2d 980
(10th Cir. 1951).
21 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
22 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
23 72 HARv. L. Rnv. 1482 (1959).
24 Id. at 1493.
25 A "wide-open" arbitration clause is one calling for the arbitration of all disputes over
the application or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. "Wide-open" arbitration clauses or reasonable facsimiles thereof can be found in the following cases: United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
Retail Shoe and Textile Salesmen's Union, Local 410 v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 185 F. Supp.
558 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
26 72 HARv. L. Rrv. 1482, 1511 (1959).
27 Id. at 1517.
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for which they are best suited, it is feasible and practicable; but insofar as under
it a grievance might come before the courts twice and the arbitrator once before
the arbitrator's jurisdiction is definitely determined, it eliminates two of the advantages of arbitration - speed and minimum expense.
2
The United States Supreme Court, through the "positive assurance" doctrine,
adopted Professor Cox's idea of sending all doubtful cases to arbitration; in fact,
the Court quoted his article in the opinion. But, evidently realizing the possibility
of three hearings before a definite determination of the arbitrator's jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court in the Enterprise Wheel case limited the investigatory powers
of the courts after arbitration to the same knowledge that was available before
the arbitration hearing and decision 29 - the wording of the contract in and of
itself.30 Thus, the Supreme Court has eliminated Professor Cox's idea of letting
the courts review the arbitrator's award and consider the facts and conclusions
expressed therein, in order to finally determine his jurisdiction. By such action,
the Supreme Court has also eliminated the possibility in some cases of a final
determination as to arbitrability. The courts have exclusive jurisdiction to deterto order arbitration
mine the arbitrabiity of a particular grievance; 3' they have
32
unless they can positively say the dispute is not arbitrable; and under the Enterprise Wheel case, they have no more power in reviewing an award than they did
at the time of the original action.3 3 Therefore, in a case in which it cannot positively be said that the dispute is not arbitrable and in which the arbitrator does
actually lack jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court must order arbitration,
the arbitrator must decide the merits of the case, and the court must enforce the
award. This is not only a serious departure from the intentions of the parties,
buy it is also contrary to most ideas of equity and justice.
In response to these teachings of the Supreme Court, the federal courts can
take one of three types of action, all of which are unsatisfactory. First of all, they
can ignore the Warrior trilogy and determine the arbitrator's jurisdiction as they
see fit; this has not occurred as yet and due to the deep respect for the Supreme
Court is not likely to take place. Secondly, and probably most reasonably, though
not in accord with the law, they can follow the lead of Circuit Judge Boreman, as
stated in the American Thread case,3 4 in cases they want to keep from the arbitrator, i.e., they can strictly construe certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, disregard others, and arrive at the conclusion that the particular
dispute is positively not arbitrable. The third response of the courts would be to
recognize the law as it is and abide by it; but, as shown above, this could possibly
result in the enforcement of an arbitration award which the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to render.
In formulating a solution to this dilemma, it is important to keep separate
the duties of the courts and the arbitrators and the reasons therefor. As has been
28 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960).
29 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
598 (1960).

30 In United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S.

564 (1960) at 568 it is stated: "The court '. . . is confined to ascertaining whether the
party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract."'
This statement, along with other statements in the Warrior trilogy, has been interpreted to
mean that the court is without authority to examine contract proposals, negotiations or past
practices. Maryland Telephone Union v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Union of
Md., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960). Contra, Local 725, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Standard Oil Company of Indiana, 186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960).
31 Cases cited note 16 supra.
32 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960).
33 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960).
34 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. i961).
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said, the courts are to determine arbitrability.3 5 The principal reason for this
authority is to enable the courts to maintain a check on the actions of arbitrators.
The arbitrators, on the other hand, have been given complete control of weighing
the merits of the case.' 6 There are several reasons for this, but they all hinge
upon the fact that, unlike the courts,s3 the arbitrators are not limited to the express provisions of the contract; they consider the "industrial common law - the
'
practices of the industry and the shop,"38
and also the contract proposals,
negotiation meetings, etc., that were important in the formation of the collective bargaining agreement.3 9
Based on these considerations, a proposed solution to the problem is to give
the courts the right to determine arbitrability either when the dispute is clearly
not arbitrable, 40 or when it clearly is arbitrable,4 ' and give them the authority
to order the arbitrator to determine his own jurisdiction over the subject matter
in all other cases. Such a solution is not beyond the power of the courts. As Justice
Brennan stated in a concurring opinion in United Steelworkers of America v.
American Manufacturing Company: "Since the arbitration clause itself is part of
the agreement, it might
be argued that a dispute as to the meaning of that clause
42
is for the arbitrator."
In addition, such a solution would retain for the courts and the arbitrators
the reasons for their participation in these matters; the courts would retain a
check against unbridled arbitration, as they would have the final say as to whether
the arbitrator exceeded his submission authority, and the arbitrator would be able
to give full play to his skill in interpreting collective bargaining agreements and
to his peculiar advantage of being able to investigate matters exterior to but connected with the collective bargaining agreement. Even more important than this,
such a solution would preserve the goals of parties who insert arbitration clauses
into their agreements; they would be guaranteed a fair decision, within a minimum
amount of time, and with a minimum of expense.
Edward 1. Fillenwarth,Jr.

35 Cases cited note 16 supra.
36 American Brake Shoe Co. v. Local 149, UAW, 285 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961);

Howard v. United States Rubber Co., 190 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1961); Textile Workers
Union of America v. Cone Mills Corp., 188 F. Supp. 728 (M.D.N.C. 1960)
37 Courts are limited to the contract itself. See cases cited notes 29 and 30 supra.
38 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 363
U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
39 Maryland Telephone Union v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of
Md., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960).
40 E.g., Local 791, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v.

Magnavox Company, 286 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960). After rendering his decision the arbitra-

tor ordered the Company to conduct an engineering survey of its assembly line; this was
clearly outside his authority.

41

E.g., Retail Shoe and Textile Salesmen's Union, Local 410 v. Sears, Roebuck and

Co., 185 F. Siupp. 558 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
42 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Company, 363 U.S.
564, 571 (1960).

